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Army Supplies in the Forward
Area and the Tumpline System
A First World War Canadian
Logistical Innovation
F.R. Phelan
Editor's Note: In British Logistics on the Western Front. 1914-1919 (Praeger, 1998), IanM. Brown documents

the problems of maintaining an army in the field: throughout that war, supply lines were strained to get
food, equipment and ammunition forward. Early problems of adequate supplies were replaced by an
inability to get the items from depots to where they were required. Some of these latter problems were
blamed on "establishments" and other force-structure problems caused by stripping logistical-support
units to meet the manpower needs of the fighting units. The decision to dramatically reduce the size of the
BEF divisions in France helped reduce pressures. By stripping a battalion out of each brigade, and using
the menfreed as replacements, the BEF maintained its paper strength in divisions (though, infact, the
strength went considerably down) and, more importantly, also reduced its overall logistical requirements.
But, as Brown writes:
The Canadian Corps successfully resisted this "downsizing," as its commander opposed the reduction
vehemently. In fact. he managed to increase the effective size and strength of his divisions by using the
manpower[rom the two [sic] Canadian divisions forming in Britain. This gave Haig a single very strong
co1ps -Jour overstrength divisions amounting to some one hundred thousand men (forty-eight thousand
i11[cmt.ry) - but it also gave his administration a supply problem, since the standard divisional pack could
not supply a Canadian division. In spite of this trouble, it did not appear to cause great d!lficulLy on the
lines of comnmnication. Indeed. it gets no mention in either the QMG's or AG's diaries .... (pp.l65-166)
Buried in tl1is passage lay two secrets. The four-battalion brigades perhaps (too simply?) explain the use of
the Canadian Corps as Haig's "shock troops." But as Brown notes, how the Canadians maintained these
larger formations is not clear from British sources (p. 1 77). The answer to this secret must be sought
elsewhere. One answer is F.R. Phelan's "tumpline."

Some Difficulties of Supply in
Trench Warfare
~e

supply of the Army in the forward area
during a war such as we experienced in 19141918 is a subject that might profitably be
elaborated on until it filled many volumes. In
these notes it is not my intention to touch on
more than that portion of the subject of supply
which seriously involved the question of
manpower in the use of carrying parties after
delivery of supplies by horse or mechanical
transport. including light railways; to set forth
the methods adopted in certain formations

1.

during the late war to overcome the difficulties
and to make suggestions for consideration during
any future campaigns.
To illustrate the difficulties that generally
confronted the troops in connection with supply
in the forward or trench area I will describe the
experiences of the 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, to which I was attached as Staff Captain,
and try and set forth the problems that faced it
and the methods adopted to overcome same.
This article was originally published in Canadian
Defence Quarterly, vol.VI, October 1928, pp.20-33.
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One of the first problems that confronted the
whole brigade after its arrival at the front was
the question of transporting supplies in the
forward or trench area after delivery by the light
railway or GS wagons at dumps or refilling
points.
Rations, water, ammunition, engineering and
medical supplies all had to be placed at the
disposal of the troops manning the trenches and
to accomplish this with the least waste of
manpower and material was a problem that had
not been properly solved, although two years of
war had passed when the II th Canadian Infantry
Brigade arrived in France in August I9I6.
During the brigade's tours of the first couple
of months in the Ypres Salient, rations and other
supplies were brought forward in the usual
manner by detailing carrying parties from the
battalions in the line or, where large quantities
were required, by ordering the battalions in
support and reserve to furnish the requisite
number of men.
Such a method was most wasteful of both
time, manpower and material and was trying on
the temper of all concerned.
Guides were often not at the appointed place,
or not punctual, causing frequent delays.
Supplies were often not at the locations
designated or were too plentiful or not sufficient
for the size of the party detailed. These, of course,
were faults that were due to inaccurate
compilation of, or attention to, orders. The very
size of the parties and the necessity of keeping
together on account of lack of knowledge of the
routes and having to depend on guides exposed
the party to the chance of heavier casualties.
This subject of carrying parties was one of
the most irritating matters with which the Staff
of the brigade and the HQ of the battalion had to
deal and led to a great deal of bad feeling at times.
From the platoon commander to the OC of the
battalion, efforts were made to try not to be called
upon to supply more than they were compelled
to for the various working and carrying parties,
as the supplying of these parties, besides tiring
the men and making them "grouch," made it very
difficult, and often hazardous, to hold the area
properly with such a depleted unit. Of course care

was exercised not to call on the line battalions
for more men than absolutely necessary, but there
were usually big engineering jobs to be done
which required men to work and men to carry
material, and then there was the regular daily
supply of water and rations, not to mention
keeping the line dumps of ammunition up to the
schedule laid down.
The subject of the large use of manpower for
these purposes was one which was being given
very serious thought by all concerned when the
first intimation came in the late summer of I9I6
that the 4th Canadian Division might be sent to
the Somme, where heavy fighting had been in
progress since July I st. The brigade after being
moved from the St. Eloi Sector, where they had
their first trench warfare experience, to in front
ofKemmel for a few days, was withdrawn about
September 2I st to the Nordausque training area
for ten days training prior to proceeding to the
Somme, where the other Canadian divisions had
been fighting so steadily and with such heavy
losses for some weeks.
Amongst the lessons that the fighting on the
Somme had taught, was the necessity of properly
organizing the supply arrangements for the
forward area, and this, coming on top of our
experience in the comparative quietness of
warfare at that date in the Salient, brought the
subject very much to our attention.
The Somme in I9I6 was the first occasion
when Canadian troops had been employed in
offensive operations on a big scale and the mud
combined with the distances to be covered had
proved a serious obstacle to overcome, not only
from a fighting, but also maintenance of supply
standpoint. It was fortunate indeed for the
brigade that information had been given it as to
the supply situation, otherwise, green troops that
they were, the battalions would have had a more
difficult time than they did, as they found that
all supplies had to be brought in either by pack
animal or man a distance of over 5,000 yards
during most of the two months tour, with the
most appalling conditions, as far as the routes
were concerned, to work under. As I was at that
time Staff Captain it devolved upon me to draft
any plans for meeting the supply situation that
we were going to face.
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The Tumpline

leather, for carrying loads. It is made up of three
component parts; principal of which is the brow
band 21" long by about 3" wide in the central
portion and tapering until about 1" wide at each
end. To each extremity is sewn a strap seven or
more feet long, one inch wide where attached to
brow band and tapering gradually until about
v., at the free end. In addition to the sewing, rivets
are sometimes added, two in each strap. to
strengthen the joint. Where it is not possible to

P

rior to the war I had done considerable
hunting and fishing in the back woods of
Quebec where the difficulties of transportation
are very great and continuous movement by water
impossible. In surmounting the difficulties of
transporting canoes and supplies between lakes,
or around bad falls or rapids, a very simple
contrivance, called the
"Tumpline," was used.
without which the difficulties
would
be
almost
insurmountable in many
cases. as four and five miles
lt'l'H CANADIAN
INF." BRIGADE.
.._ . __________ ..
21" ____ ....... _ ... _..
over a very rough trail was
no unusual distance to carry
2;i'
,c-; .-'"ci .'
the outfit. I therefore
~;
suggested to the brigade
commander that this method
of transportation be adopted
I
to meet the difficulties
confronting us in forwarding
supplies and that a special
i
brigade company be formed
I
I
for this purpose. He
approved of the suggestion
and ordered me to draw up
the necessary instructions,
I
detail the men for the company and obtain the material
I
i
I
to manufacture the tumpi"-\,)i
j
lines. This was done and
II
_,
demonstration given to the
I
brigade staff and battalion officers, which proved to them
the value of the method.
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Before proceeding with a
brief history of the work of
the "Tumpliners," as they
were called, it might be well
for the sake of those who are
not familiar with this method
of transportation to give a
description of the tumpline.
its origin, the method of
carrying and the military
loads that can be easily
transported.
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simple contrivance, of oiled
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A carrying party from the 11th Canadian Brigade Tumpline Company
making their way towards the frontline, September 191 7.

obtain straps seven feet long, two pieces can be
joined together, although this joint sometimes
interferes with the quick tying or untying of the
knot. Tumplines made of canvas or web are
absolutely useless, as they become soggy, stringy,
and wrinkled when they get wet, and difficult to
untie under these conditions, and also chafe the
head. Good tumplines can be manufactured by
any regimental saddler or shoemaker from
salvaged surcingles and reins.
It is impossible to give the exact date or the
country of origin of the tumpline, or heads trap
as it is sometimes called, but forms of it are to
be found in countries in every portion of the globe
where heavy loads have to be carried any
considerable distance. In Canada, it has been
used by both Indians and Whites since, and
probably before, the days of the French regime,
when the Voyageurs, or Coureurs-des-Bois, as
the French Canadian trappers were called, had
only two methods oftransportation, their canoes
and their backs, and today, in the north country
and backwoods, where other transportation
facilities do not exist, nearly all loads have to be
carried by the tumpline. It is no unusual thing to
see a trapper or a bushman taking his winter
supplies in over the trail; these men will often

carry a small barrel of salt pork and a sack of
flour in one load, the weight running from 250
to 350 pounds. The general rule. however. is that
the load must not exceed the carrier's weight. In
the north country, where the rivers are broken
by many rapids, the river-men have to unload
their scows, bring them through the rapids light,
and portage all their goods with the tumpline.
The method of carrying is the same in all
countries, the underlying principle being that the
weight is borne on the head and the pressure of
the weight is in a straight line down the spine, as
the spine can support with more ease heavy
weights, while carrying them. than any other part
of the body. This is well illustrated in the bulky
and heavy weights carried on the top of the head
by the natives of Africa and the East.
To prepare for carrying with the tumpline,
the load of boxes. sacks. etc., is piled up and
tied together by passing one long strap round
each end of the load and tying either with a timber
hitch, or simply a half hitch with the free end as
a bow so that same can be undone immediately.
When the load consists of a number of small
articles the usual method is to roll them in a
blanket in conjunction with the tumpline.
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The two ends being tied up leaves the wide
brow band forming a loop. This loop is passed
over the top of the head just above the brow and
the load rests high up on the back. The length of
the loop is determined by the tumpliner, and
depends largely on his height and the position
on his back that he prefers to carry his load.
The tumpliner walks slightly bent forward
and if he wishes can steady the load by holding
the straps about the level of the ears. If the
tumpliner is desirous of a change or a rest for
the neck, the tumpline can he pulled down in
front of the chest, allowing the straps to rest on
the shoulders, and by passing the arm through
the loop of the browband hold the load in
position. By doing this, the weight rests on the
shoulders assisted by the arm used to hold it
there; this method makes a good change but is
seldom resorted to except for very short
distances.
In preparing the load care should be taken
that no projections are left on the side of the load
that rests against the back, as it is impossible in
that case to carry a load very far without the back
becoming galled.
The loads that are carried depend largely on
the nature of the goods that are required to be

moved, the distance to be covered, and the nature
of the ground over which the tumpliner has to
go.
On the Somme, during the months of October
and November 1916, under very adverse weather
conditions, the Brigade Tumpline Company
carried the following as loads, working nearly
every night for 45 consecutive days traversing
between 4000 to 5000 yards; this being the
distance between the Main and Advanced Dumps.
1 to 2 boxes small arms ammunition
4 boxes Mills Grenades
3 boxes Stokes Shells
2 boxes Bully Beef
1 case Biscuits
1 bale Sandbags
2 coils Barbed Wire
l dozen Shovels
1 dozen Picks

On one occasion five complete Soyer Stoves and
three 50-gallon iron tanks were forwarded the
same distance by a party of eight men in one load.
A more detailed list will be found at the end
of these notes giving practically all the various
articles that are required to be moved in the
forward area, showing the size or nature of the
load, the weight, the number of men required to

A variety of items are being carried using the tumplime: rolls of wire mesh, rolls
Q[ barbed wire and spiral pickets on which to string the barbed wire.
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~

A Canadian soldier makes his way out of the supply depot carrying his load using the tumpline
while his companions prepare to get under way. Note the collection of rum jugs in the centre of the
photo.

carry the load with and without the tumpline,
the percentage of manpower saved by using the
tumpline, together with remarks on each class
of load.
As a general rule, almost any small article
required in the forward area can be carried by
the tumpline; under war conditions the weight
should not exceed 75-100 lbs for regular work
but this is governed largely by the bulk of the
load.

The 11th Canadian Brigade
Tumpline Company
n ~rganizing f~r carrying on the work, the
Bngade Tumplme Company was formed with
an establishment of 1 officer, 4 NCOs and 80
privates, divided into four equal sections; each
battalion of the brigade furnishing one complete
section, whilst the officer was detailed by the
brigade from the battalion that had the fewest
officers "on command." Experience proved that
this made a very efficient, easily handled and,
for most purposes, sufficiently large unit, and
the original establishment was adhered to
throughout the balance of the war.

I

After the experience of the Somme, 1916,
each battalion formed an additional section
composed of 1 NCO and 15 to 20 men, depending
on the strength of the battalion, to be used in
forwarding the unit's rations and water to the
front line, as well as to assist the brigade
company in the forwarding of ammunition and

supplies in an emergency or during heavy
operations.
This latter development left the brigade
company free to fulfill the brigade's
responsibilities as far as supply was concerned
in the area. This special company was completely
segregated from the battalions, and acted as a
separate unit under the orders of the brigade Staff
Captain.
The battalion sections were generally placed
under the orders of the battalion Bombing Officer
and were attached to the unit headquarters.
Outside of the regular infantry equipment,
each NCO and man was equipped with a
tumpline, and, in addition, each battalion section
had a number of special sacks, each capable of
holding four or five sandbags of rations. which
enabled one tumpliner to carry forward 32-40
rations in one load. These sacks were made of
waterproof canvas, and of a size that enabled the
sandbags to be put in with the long side across
tho top of the bag being closed up by folding over
and tying with two thongs. Two "0" rings were
sewn on one side about a quarter of the way down
the sack, and fifteen inches from centre to centre,
which enabled them to be used to hang on to a
pack-saddle, when pack-animals were available
and these rings served to attach the tumpline to
when being packed by tumpliner.
The men wore their box-respirators at the
"alert" and when necessary could don their
masks and continue their work (this was done
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A corporal helps one of his soldiers to hoist his load while others adjust their tumplines. Leaving
aside the question of weight. this photo clearly illustrates that the sheer bulk of the boxes being
carried woald preclade their easy conveyance without aid of the tampline.

on many occasions) but the work had then to be
necessarily rather slow and tedious at night.
The tumpline does not in any way interfere
with the wearing of the steel helmet.
The training of the men was very simple, no
previous experience being required, although, of
course, very useful. The men were first taught to
tie up the load, and. after mastering the simple
knots used, they were allowed to carry light loads
short distances. with fairly long spells of physical
exercises for the neck, back and shoulders,
together with demonstrations from the instructor
between "carries." For the first two or three days,
they were not allowed to do much carrying, the
great danger being that the men found the work
so simple that they overdid it, thus getting a stiff
neck, and were liable to get discouraged. Like
every other work or exercise. which requires
muscles not in constant use, the muscles have
to become accustomed to the work, and with the
tumpline this was best accomplished by light
loads for the first two or three days, together with
physical drill. When these points were observed
it was found that in less than a week the men
became very efficient in their work.

Some Advantages of the Tumpline
n order to realize the benefits that the brigade
secured by using this method of transportation,
it is only necessary to consider some of the
advantages, for, without attempting to make any
extravagant claims for the tumpline, it may safely
be said that one man equipped with it can do the
work of two men carrying supplies in the ordinary
way, do it quicker, and at the end be fresher than
the two men would have been.

I

Some of the advantages of the tumpline over
other forms of carriers or methods of carrying,
are as follows:(a) It weighs but a few ounces and therefore
does not add materially to the weight of the load.
(b) It can be very easily adjusted to the load;
thus cutting down the time which parties would
usually spend around a dump. This feature is
especially valuable when loads have to be
prepared under shell fire.
(c) When the load has been delivered, the
tumpliner throws his tumpline over his shoulder,
bandolier fashion, and does not notice its weight
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or pressure any more than he would a regular
bandolier; in fact not as much. This is not the
case with more bulky forms of carriers which,
as they are clumsy and have a considerable
weight, are often considered a nuisance by the
carrier, who is liable to ditch them if an
opportunity offers.
(d) If the carrying party comes under heavy
shell fire suddenly, and it is advisable to take
cover quickly, the load carried by the tumpliner
can be dropped instantly, leaving the man free
from any encumbrances and able to act with the
least possible delay. With other forms of carriers,
it often necessary to have the assistance of one
or two other men to remove the load from the
back.
(e) When going through a trench, if a stretcher
party or others are met, the tumpliner can easily
throw his load on the parapet and allow the party
to pass him; this cannot be so easily done with
other carriers. This is also a big advantage when
it is necessary to jump into or over a trench; the
load can be dropped on the parapet or tossed
across as the case may be, and the tumpliner
can then easily jump into the trench or across
and take up the load again; with a load strapped
to the back, jumping over or into a trench is
almost an impossibility; in the first place, the
load would be almost sure to catch the edge of
the trench and throw the man on his face, and in
the second place the weight would in most cases
prevent the man from being able to jump at all.
If other forms of carriers were to be removed
from the back and tossed across the trench, the
weight of the load would be very liable to break
the framework of the apparatus.
(f) On arrival at destination the tumpliner's
load can be instantly put down and untied
without delay.

(g) The load does not tire the tumpliner nearly
as quickly as loads whose weight is supported
by the shoulders. A tumpliner can shift the weight
of his load from the brow to the shoulders at any
time, or by a slight pressure of the hands can
divide it between brow and shoulders.
(h) The tumpline can be quickly made by any
regimental shoemaker or saddler, its cost being
small compared with other carriers, as salvaged
leather can be used to a large extent.

(i) Practically no training is required to teach
men to use the tumpline.

(j) When used in muddy or wet weather, the
tumpline will not become heavy or soggy from
wet or mud, as wood or canvas carriers will.

(k) Wet weather is liable to so shrink the
canvas of other carriers, if the laces are not
loosened, that the frames will be broken; the
tumpline does not have to contend with this.
(l) The amount of ground required at the
dump by a large party, equipped with the
tumpline, for loading up is very small compared
to the way the carriers would have to spread out
to load up other forms of packs.
(m) One of the advantages of having a
permanent company, is that the men quickly
learn the location of dumps. the best routes,
spots to be avoided, both on account of bad
walking or shell and rifle fire, location of units,
etc.
(n) It was a rare thing to find that a tumpliner
had ditched any part of his load; this could not
be said of ordinary carrying parties.
(o) When not required for forwarding of
supplies, the compay was advantageously
employed in salvage work.
(p) The tumpliner can carry out slightly
wounded cases, which, from the nature of their
wounds, cannot walk, thus relieving a stretcher
party.
(q) That the men themselves like it, and
consider the tumpline an easy form of carrying
was evident by the fact, that, although they did
far more work than they would do in the line,
still they considered it a punishment if they were
sent back to ordinary regimental duty.
One very distinct advantage was noticed in
the forwarding of cans of water. With the ordinary
carrying party each man took two cans; these
seldom arrived at the forward area more than
half full, as it was found that the men were liable
to spill some of the water to lighten the load, or,
when passing working parties, to give a drink to
the workers. It was therefore necessary to have
double the quantity of cans and double the
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carrying party required for the amount needed
for the line.
The turnpliner carried three, and, for short
distances, or where the trail was good, four petrol
cans full, and thus greatly reduced the party
required. If the can was not full, the water
swished from side to side, ,and made the load
more difficult to carry, therefore the tumpliner
saw to it that he had a set of full cans. For the
same reason, and because the cans were tied
together, he did not give away his water en route.
This again is a valuable fact, inasmuch that it
was necessary to have undamaged cans, and,
therefore, they were not so liable to become
punched to allow the water to run freely, or the
stoppers to be lost.

Saving in Manpower

'll ]bat a tremendous saving in manpower to
VV the British Expeditionary Force and the
other Allied Armies would have resulted from the

general use of the tumpline along the lines
inaugurated in the 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade can be readily realized by a little
calculation.
As, at the very least, all parties were cut down
50 percent. (and in the forwarding of certain
supplies the percentage was much higher) by
using the tumpline, it requires very little
imagination or figuring to see the value of this
method of carrying. Basing the calculation on a
50 percent. reduction in manpower and using
one tumpline company of 85 per brigade, and
one company for divisional troops, the saving in
manpower in the BEF would have been well over
20,000 men. In addition, if every infantry
battalion had had its own tumpline section, and
other units in the division in proportion, there
would have been an additional saving of about
10,000 men. This would have meant a total of
over 30,000 men saved for other purposes almost
every day, and in giving these figures a very
conservative estimate is made, as the calculations
are based on a lower number of divisions
than we had in the field on the Western Front
at the time they were made.
At a time when reinforcements were so
difficult to obtain, and the method of
transportation in the forward area required
so many men, it is unfortunate that the whole
army did not have companies along these
lines. The First Army was very aggressive on
the subject after the method had been
brought to the attention of the Staff and due
to the energy of the MGGS most of the
formations in the Army adopted the tumpline
in the latter part of 1917 and early in 1918.
I figured out at one time, from the reports
that I had received from the various
formations
using the tumpline,

Nature of Load: Vickers Gun
Weight Q{ Load: 93 lbs.
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men
Percentage saved in manpower
by use of tumpline: 50 percent

Nature of Load: 4 18 "l.b shells
Weight of Load: 96 lbs.
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men
Percentage saved in manpower
by use of tumpline: 50 percent
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approximately what amount of manpower was
at that time being conserved in the limited portion
of the Expeditionary Force concerned and my
estimate ran well over a brigade's fighting
strength.

The Work of the 11th Brigade
Tumpline Company
~

record the activities, devotion to duty
and heroic actions of the members of the
Brigade Tumpline Company and the battalion

..1

Nature of Load: 4 tins of water
Weight qf Load: 1 04 lbs.
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men
Percentage saved in manpower
by use of tumpline: 50 percent

sections would require a volume in itself. That it
was no bomb proof job was evident from the fact
that the proportion of casualties was very high.
Yet, despite this fact, the arduous duties
performed, combined with the necessity for the
unit being always on duty whilst the brigade
occupied a sector, giving them practically little
or no rest from the trenches, the men liked their
work and the only punishment meted out was
return to regimental duty. Probably the secret of
the popularity of the work was the relief from
the monotony of trench life and the realization
of something accomplished after each night's
duty.
The first experiences of the company were
amongst the worst that they had to go through.

and were during the preparation for the brigade's
first big attack on the Somme in 1916. The men
dug themselves in on the slopes of Sausage Valley,
and worked from the main brigade dump
forward to a new dump that they were ordered
to establish in the famous sunken road running
by Courcelette. The location chosen was down
the slope towards Death Valley where the road
forked to Pys and Miraumont; the dump was for
supplies for use in the Regina Trench operations
of the 21st October.

Nature qf Load: 1 bale of sandbags
Weight of Load: 115 lbs. (dry)
Usual Carrying Party: 4 men
Percentage saved in manpower
by use qf tumpline: 75 percent

A very short period was available in which to
complete the work, and night after night these

men, assisted by ordinary carrying parties drawn
from the battalions, and the Brigade Pack Train,
toiled over the 5,000 yards (nearly 3 miles) of
that shell torn ground with their heavy loads.
The Sugar Refinery, the cross roads at
Courcelette and, above all, the Sunken Road were
favourite spots for the Hun to straffe, yet never
once did this little company of men fail to deliver
their loads at the destination, despite many
casualties.
The heartbreaking part of that first task was
that a few days before the attack on Regina
Trench the Hun located the new dump and
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completely destroyed it by shell fire. It was
possible to salve some of the scattered
ammunition and engineering material but the
hundreds of water tins were riddled with
shrapnel, the water all spilt and the tins rendered
useless. This salvaging work was tedious and
being done in the open in daylight brought a lot
of harassing fire, with resultant casualties.
The destruction of this dump was serious as
contained the reserves of ammunition,
engineering material, water and rations for the
projected attack. Immediate steps had to be
taken in the few days remaining to replace it and
this required the utmost speed and every ounce
of energy that the men had. Fortunately, the rain
was not present to turn the ground into the
quagmire it later became, or human effort could
not have acomplished what those men did. For
the last few nights large additional carrying
parties were detailed to the work, some coming
from other brigades, and we had as many as 500
additional men working at the job.

it

The picture presented by these parties was a
weird one. ihe nights were pitch dark and it was
impossible to see much around one, except when
the dim reflection from flares momentarily
silhouetted the figures of the toiling men. Very
little talking was indulged in except when
complimentary remarks were made for the
benefit of those who cared to listen when someone
stumbled into a shell hole with his load, or
stubbed his toe against some obstruction.
The casualties on those last few nights were
heavy, one officer Lt. E. Renouf, of the 54th, was
killed and several officers wounded, whilst at
least 20 percent of the other ranks were killed
or wounded.
To assist the Tumpline Company in all big
operations, the Brigade Pack Train was called
together, composed of riding and light draught
horses and their drivers, to the number of 15
from each battalion. Each battalion section was
in charge of its own officer and whilst nominally
under the charge of the Brigade Transport Officer,
usually worked on its own initiative once the
tasks were allotted. The Pack Train would usually
work from the main dump to an advanced dump,
and in every operation did yeoman service and
assisted materially in the success of the supply
arrangements.

The Tumpline Company's activities did not
cease with the completion of the dumps prior to
the operation. The next task was to start moving
forward the munitions to new positions, selected
beforehand on the map, just as soon as the
attacks had been successfully launched and the
captured ground was being consolidated. This
work usually occupied the first few hours of the
operation. Then it was called upon to assist in
removing the wounded and join the special
parties of stretcher bearers that had been detailed
for the purpose.
The other operations on the Somme, in 1916,
were, in a general way, a repetition of the first
tasks but, with the experience gained, many of
the troubles encountered in the first instance
were avoided.
Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele each
presented their particular problems and passed
on. During regular tours, between big operations,
the work was routine, comparatively simple of
accomplishment, and need not be dwelt upon.
The battalion sections, which were a later
development of the organization, were most
useful, their efficiency naturally depending a good
deal on the individual officer in charge of their
activities.
The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Tumpline Company was the first organization of
its kind and made the first serious and consistent
use of the tumpline in the war. Various claims
have been laid to the credit of having introduced
the tumpline on the Western Front; all probably
were the first in their particular area; the trouble
was that the method was not followed up or an
organization formed until the 11th Brigade made
it a success, and probably the first official
recognition of this method is to be found in the
First Army communiques and reports issued in
July1917.

Disadvantages of Normal
Method of Carrying Supplies
~e

photographs included herewith show in a
very graphic way the tremendous savings in
manpower by the use of the tumpline.

.l
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In considering or drawing up suggestions for
the future, one must bear in mind that there are
two questions that are of paramount importance
in connection with supplies and their handling
in the forward area, namely:-

in the light of a fatigue rather than a fighting duty
and, in consequence of this, there was not the
same interest taken in the work that the same
men would have shown in their other regular
duties.

(a) Cutting down of manpower.
(b) Conservation, and economical use of all
natures of supplies.

(b) This lack of interest resulted in two things:
first, the men carried as little as they could, and,
secondly, they very often ditched a portion of their
load, if the opportunity offered. This resulted not
only in lost manpower, but in damaged or lost
material.

The methods mostly used on the Western
front for the forwarding of supplies in the forward
area, were:(a) Light railways.
(b) Pack animals.
(c) Carrying parties.

The light railway, when properly organized,
is, during trench warfare, by far the most
satisfactory method of forwarding supplies, on
account of the large tonnage handled with a small
personnel, the speed with which it can be moved,
and the elimination of waste. But even on the
most quiet fronts, trains are able to go forward
only to certain points, from which supplies have
to be transported to their final destination by
pack animals or carrying parties. On a very active,
or battle front, the difficulties of keeping the track
through are very great, and practically very little
use can be made of the line forward of the field
gun positions, if that far, and recourse has to be
made to other methods of transportation.
Pack animals were used with much success
during the past campaign but the shortage of
animals was a serious handicap to this method
and the fact that they were compelled to keep
certain routes, or tracks, and the impossibility
of ever protecting either the men or animals from
shell fire, resulted in heavy casualties on a battle
front.
The last method, carrying parties, composed
of men drawn usually from infantry battalions,
was the most common method in use for the final
forwarding of a large percentage of the material
required in the forward area, and it is with this
portion of the subject that the suggestions about
to be put forward are made. This method and
the manner of detailing the parties was most
wasteful, both of manpower and material, for the
following reasons:(a) Despite attempts made to counteract the
feeling, the infantry looked on carrying parties

(c) Such a carrying party was, in many cases,
new to the work; was not familiar with the routes
over which it had to go and, therefore, dependent
on guides, who very often were none too familiar
with the routes themselves, thus causing
unnecessary delays or detours with resulting
fatigue to the men.
(d) This lack of knowledge of the route
necessitated large parties keeping together with
resulting heavier casualties. if under fire, and
slowness of movement.

Advantages of Permanent
Carrying Parties
n view of the above it is submitted that in order
to overcome these conditions it is necessary to
have some organization whose particular duty
would be the forwarding of ammunition.
engineering materials, rations and water in, the
forward area.

I

The value of such an organization would be
hard to compute but in view of the experience
already gained it is felt that a little investigation
would show the advisability of giving it
consideration. The following points should be
noted in connection with this proposal:(a) The forwarding of ammunition, etc.,
would be its sole duty, (outside of fighting in an
emergency), and therefore the men would see that
any certain amount of material would be
forwarded with the least loss of time or material
as they would know that if the task was not
completed one night it would have to be finished
the next.
(b) The personnel of such an organization
would quickly learn all routes, locations of
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dumps, headquarters, etc., in their area., thus
cutting out the necessity for guides. The men
could be sent out in smaller parties, thus
eliminating the crowding which happened with
large parties; unwieldy parties caused loss of time
and a heavier percentage of casualties. They
would also avoid bad spots in the routes, either
from the point of bad walking or enemy fire.
(c) An esprit-de-corps would gradually spring
up in such an organization which would cause
the men to put forth their best efforts thus cutting
down manpower required to move certain
amounts of supplies.
(d) If this organization were equipped with
the tumpline for carrying, the manpower required
would be cut down from 50 percent to 75 percent.
and over as previously explained.

brigades holding the front and a company
allotted to each sub-sector and one company
between the artillery and divisional troops,
when necessary, or retained as a reserve or for
reliefs.
(e) As far as possible the four companies of
the divisional sector be retained in one area as
long as the situation permits and inter-company
reliefs carried on as the nature of the work
demands.
(f) When big operations were pending, two
companies to be withdrawn from the non-active
divisional sectors and moved to the coming battle
front early enough to become familiar with the
new ground.

(g) These additional companies to be attached
to divisional sectors as required.

This organization, to be a definite success,
would have to be run entirely separate from the
infantry and under its own administration in a
similar manner to the Forestry Corps, the light
railways, etc.

(h) The headquarters of the formation to run
a central school to train reinforcements; 5
percent. of the strength of the total companies
should be under training at all times.

These special units to be attached to divisions
or brigades for work as required.

Proposed Establishment
of a Tumpline Company
Detail

Suggested Tumpline Organization
~e

following is a proposed scheme of the
.l. establishment and method of work of such
an organization:(a) There would be four companies formed
for each division of the force, each one having a
strength of 100 all ranks as per establishment
given further on.
(b) These companies to be controlled from a
headquarters of the new formation which would
detail 4 companies for every divisional sector and
these companies, through a group commander
or adjutant, would take their orders as to
divisions with whom they should work, from the
HQ of the Army holding that portion of the line.
(c) The whole organization to come under the
direct control of its own headquarters at GHQ.
(d) Divisional sectors to be divided into subsectors in accordance with the number of

I

Officers

Other
Ranks

Totals

Captains

l

1

Subalterns

2

2

CSM&CQMS
Sergeants
Corporals

i

i

2

4

4

4

4

87

Privates
Totals

2

3

(a)

97

87
100

(a) Includes 2 cooks. 2 stretcher-bearers and 3 batmen.
Note: Company divided into HQ and four sections. HQ
composed of three officers. CSM and CQMS. 2 cooks. 2
stretcher bearers and 3 batmen. Section composed of
l Sergeant. l Corporal and 20 Privates. One subaltern
in charge of two sections. The four companies for each
division comprising the force could be originally drawn
from the force, one from each infantry brigade and one
from divisional troops and struck off in the same way
as LTMB personnel. and reinforcements demanded to
replace. Each section and HQ of the company to have a
LTMB cart for transport of blankets, cooking utensils,
etc.

In addition to this independent formation,
every fighting unit in the force should have a
section of men trained in the use of the tumpline
who could he used in an emergency or as
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Tumpline Loadls

Load

Vickers's Gw1
4 Belt Boxes
2 Boxes Lewis Gun
ammunition

Weight
of Load
(in lbs.)

Number of Men
Required to Carry

Percentage
of
manpower
saved

With
tumpline

Without
tumpline

93
92

1
1

2
2

50%
50%

94

1

2

50%

Remarks

Gun in case weighs 39lbs.; Tripod 54lbs.
Each box weighs 23 lbs.

This load only up to 1 mile on good trail. '1\vo boxes of 6
Stokes' Shells, 3 boxes

126

1

1 1;2

33 l/3%

shells ordinary load for long distance. No saving in
manpower but shells kept in clean condition. 3 shells in
sandbag weigh 33 lbs.

Stokes' 3-in. Gun

108

1

3

66 2/3%

79

I

2

50%

158

1

4

75%

3 Boxes Hales' grenades

120

1

3

662/3%

Too heavy for regular works; 1Wo boxes much better load.

3 Boxes Mills'

75

1

1 1;2

33 1/3%

Very easy load; could be carried very long distances.

4 Boxes Mills'

100

1

2

50%

2 x 6-in Newtons'

106

1

2

50%

4 x 18lb shells

96

1

2

20%

2 x 4.5-in shells

70
116
67
78
115lbs

1
1
1
1

2
2
2215
3

50%
50%
58%
662/3%

1

4

75%

Saves breaking bales.

70

1

2

50%

\\eight including two stakes. Single roll weigl1S 33lbs.

96

1

3

662/3%

110

1

31/3

70%

66
70

1
1

1 1;5

16 2/3%
20%

72
64
160

1
1
1

142
104

1OCXl rounds Small
Arms Ammunition

20CXl rounds Small
Arms Ammunition

20 x 4.5-in charges
12 Shovels
12 Picks
1 Bale Sandbags
2 Rolls Barbed Wire
6 sheets Corrigated
Iron. heavy
lO sheets Corrigated
Iron, light
12 Stakes, short
lO Stakes, !11ediwn
8 Stakes, long
Roll telephone wire
Roll telephone wire
Gas projector and
cylinder
4 Tins ofWlter

dry

70-90
Ration sack (32-40
rations); Meat sent in
separate box
1 case Biscuits
2 cases Bully Beef

less meat
95-120

2
2-4

37 L-2%
50%
50-75%

1

3

66 2/3%

1

2

50%

2-21;2

500/o - 600/o

2
2

50%
50%

All round easy load for tun1pline.
Too heavy for regular work; only for short distance in
emergency.

Good ordinary load; for emergency can be easily increased

to6boxes.

Particularly useful for salvaging; the san1e anummition
boxed can be carried much more easily.
Particularly easy load.

Very difficult to carry if windy. but this also applies to
ordinary carrying

Too heavy for practical work.
Projector 66lbs. Base plate 16lbs. Gas dnm1 empty 33
lbs.; full 60 lbs.
In the usual way tins as a rule arrive half empty.

1

full

1

ration
68
90

1
1
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1 1/4
1 3;5

Gun bbl. weighs 49 lbs. Base plate 30 lbs. Bipod 29 lbs.

Sacks are made of burlap or canvas, and hold 5-6 sandbags

Difficult loads for ordinary carriers.
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occasion required when the regular companies
were not available.
For an infantry battalion, 10 men under a
lance corporal should be sufficient; batteries of
artillery and engineering companies should
manage with 5 trained men. Machine gun
companies should have sufficient trained men
in each gun section to care for the gun and belt
boxes and to replace casualties during an action;
in fact, I would advocate every member of a
machine gun company and Lewis gun crews in
infantry battalions to be trained in the use of the
tumpline, as well as a couple of men in each
platoon whose duty it would be to carry in attack
a dozen shovels or picks for use in digging in.
The resultant increased efficiency in action and
the savings in man-power should be apparent to
the most casual observer.
Stretcher bearers of battalions and bearer
sections of field ambulances should be trained
in the carrying of slightly wounded with the
tumpline. In this connection we experimented
by utilizing the tumpline in carrying the stretcher,
but not enough was done to enable me to
recommend its use, although I feel that it could
be developed along the lines I was working on.
All these men could be trained at the school
maintained by the new formation.
In a future campaign, conditions may have
changed so that we will have no trench warfare
as we knew it during the late war, which would
do away with the advantage that would otherwise
be in evidence from the men becoming familiar
with one particular sector. Under conditions
where the battle area was a rapidly changing one,

these trained men would however be in a better
position to grasp the situation and handle their
work than would troops drawn from the fighting
units who had had no special training. In open
warfare, the carrying troops would have to work
in very close liaison with the units of the division
they were allotted to, and some readjustment of
the method of command laid down for trench
warfare. would have to be made.
On the previous page are given comparative
particulars of loads, carried, with and without
the tumpline, in the Canadian Corps during the
Great War.
There are many other details that could be
gone into but the scope of these notes does not
require it and enough has been set out to give a
general idea of what was accomplished and what
might be done in the future.
Frederick Ross Phelan was born in
Montreal on 8 August 1885. At the outbreak
of the First World War, he joined the Canadian
Expeditionary Force. He served in France and
in 1917 was appointed Staff Captain, 11th
Canadian Infantry Brigade. When war ended,
he was Deputy Assistant Quartermaster
General at Canadian Corps Headquarters
with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. During
the Second World War, Phelan served in a
number of capacities including commander
of all Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units
in the United Kingdom, commander of
Canadian forces in Newfoundland, and
Director General Reserve Army. He retired
from the army in 1945 with the rank of
major-general.
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